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Secured Transactions—Financing Statement—Priority of Creditors as
to After-Acquired Collateral—Under UCC—National Cash Register
Co. v. Firestone CI Co. 1—On June 15, 1960, plaintiff (hereinafter "Nation-
al") and Carroll, a restauranteur, entered into a conditional sales contract
with respect to a cash register. Subsequently, Carroll obtained a loan from
the defendant (hereinafter "Firestone") and delivered to it a security agree-
ment covering
All contents of luncheonette including equipment such as: booths
and tables, ... milk dispenser, ... 1957 Ford A57R107215 together
with all property and articles now, and which may hereafter be, used
or mixed with, added or attached to, and/or substituted for, any
of the foregoing described property.
The description of collateral in the properly filed financing statement of this
security agreement was a copy of the security agreement omitting the
reference to after-acquired collateral (italicized portion above). National
subsequently delivered the cash register to Carroll and they executed a
second conditional sales contract which superceded the original. Firestone
did not perfect its interest until three weeks after the consummation of the
sale. When Carroll later defaulted on his obligations to both parties, Fire-
stone took possession of the cash register and, although it had been notified
of National's claim thereto, sold it at public auction. National brought an
action of tort for the conversion of the cash register. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reversed a finding for National by the Appellate
Division of the Municipal Court of Boston and entered judgment for
Firestone. HELD: The financing statement filed by,Firestone was adequate
under Section 9-402(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code,2 and it served
to notify any subsequent creditor of defendant's security interest including
that in collateral acquired after the transaction.
An objective of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is to eliminate
the confusion which had permeated the area of chattel mortgagess in after-
acquired collateral! At common law, a chattel mortgage which purported to
cover the mortgagor's property and any or all property he might acquire in
the future was void at laws as to property not in existence and belonging to
him° at the time of his giving the mortgage. This rule was generally followed
by most states with deviations which ranged from fully allowing such
1 — Mass. —, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
2 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 106, § 9-402(1) (1959). The sections of the Uniform
Commercial Code hereinafter utilized are unchanged from the Official Text and will be
cited as "UCC — ."
3 The term adopted by the UCC is "security interest." UCC § 1 -201(37).
4 Official comment, UCC § 9-101.
5 Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806 (1912). (Such
interests were enforceable at equity against purchasers with notice but not creditors.)
Riverview State Bank v. Ernest, 198 F.2d 876, 882 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 892 (1952) (Kansas common law rule); Jones v. Richardson, 51 Mass. (10 Met.)
481 (1845). Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, supra note 5, 207 N.Y. at 209; and
1 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 138 (6th ed. 1933).
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mortgages,7 to permitting them in special instancess or even to declaring them
wholly void.°
A relaxation of the stringent common law rule occurred with the allow-
ance of the intervening act rule. This permitted a mortgage on property to
be acquired upon the doing of some affirmative act by the mortgagee after
the mortgagor's acquisition of the property? Such an act was usually the
mortgagee's seizure of the property after its acquisition by the mortgagor?'
The increasing complexity of the commercial structure made it apparent that
such a policy would strangle the growth of commerce. This resulted in the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association approving the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
(UTRA)'2 which introduced the concept of "notice filing.'"3 In accepting,
without question, the validity of a security interest in after-acquired chattels,
the UTRA permitted the filing of only enough information to put any sub-
sequent creditor of the debtor on notice of the existence of prior security
interests in the debtor's holdings. Rather than requiring him to file the
actual agreement, which in a given case may well have been a lengthy docu-
ment, the Act made a simple form effective."
The Uniform Commercial Code, in keeping with its basic policy "to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions
..." and "to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices ...
retained the notice filing concept." The drafters of the Code indicated that
the use of such a "notice financing statenient is permissive rather than
mandatory."" Should such a method be employed, the Code sets up
machinery whereby disclosure of all of the secured collateral may be obtained
from the secured party at the debtor's request? The only sanction arising
out of the creditor's refusal to make such disclosure is possible liability to the
debtor but not to the injured creditor.2° The permissive nature of this section
is far from satisfactory for should the prior creditor refuse to comply with
7 Pearson v. Rapstina, 203 F.2d 313, 314 (5th Cir. 1953). (If parties intend a
security interest to attach to after-acquired property, it is valid.)
8 Davis v. Smith-Springfield Body Corp., 250 Mass. 278, 283, 145 N.E. 434 (1924).
(A mortgage on after-acquired property creates no lien on the property.)
9 Supra note 5.
10 Cunningham v. Sizer Steel Corp., 1 F.2d 337, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 1924).
11 Ibid.
12 The first state to enact the UTRA was New York in 1934. McKinney's Pers. Prop.
Law §§ 50-58m (1934). New York was followed by 38 other states and Puerto Rico.
13 1..1TRA § 13 required the filing statement to contain only a general description of
the goods to be covered.
14 Ibid.
13 UCC § 1-102(2)(a).
16 UCC 	 1-102(2) (b).
17 Official Comment 2, UCC § 9-402.
19 Ibid.
19 UCC § 9-208 provides in part:
(I) . . . When the security agreement or any other record kept by the secured
party identifies the collateral a debtor may similarly request the secured party
to approve or correct a list of the collateral
211 UCC 	 9-208(2).
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the request for information, one who wants to become a secured creditor finds
himself in the situation of taking a chance on his security or not making the
loan.
Although in the instant case, National had a purchase money security
interest"- and consequently could have perfected its interest by filing within
the ten-day grace period provided for such an interest, 22 it did not take ad-
vantage of this protection. If this had been done, National's security interest
in the cash register would have had priority over that of Firestone.23 This
protection which was available to National, but which it overlooked, appears
to have had a salving influence on the court." Had National been simply a
prospective secured creditor, and not the holder of a purchase money security
interest, it would not have had such protection available.25 In such a situation
the first creditor could tie up all assets of the debtor, both present and
future, as well as the potential of the debtor to expand his commercial
activities through secured loans. A subsequent creditor would not take the
chance of having his supposed secured loan become unsecured due to the
prior creditor's security interest in after-acquired collateral of the debtor and
his refusal to state the scope of his security interest. In this situation the
drafters of the Code recommend—perhaps somewhat naively—that the former
creditor should use the alternative method of filing the financing statement 23
Had the court in the instant case held that it is unnecessary to include
in the financing statement notice of a security interest in after-acquired
collateral, the above-stated problem might well have been more troublesome
than it was. It did not so hold, but merely followed the dictate of the Code27
in finding that the description utilized by National in the financing statement
was sufficient to indicate "the types ... of collateral." 28 This sufficiency of
description requisite for the adequacy of a filed statement of secured goods
was the rule in Massachusetts prior to the enactment of the Code and
should impose no real difficulties for the practitioner. It is an illustration of
an area where the Code has codified existing contract law."
ARNOLD W. PROSKIN
27 UCC 9-107.
22 UCC 9-312(4).
23 UCC 9-312(3).
24
 Supra note 1, 191 N.E.2d at 473 and 475.
25 UCC 4 9-312(5).
26 Official Comment 2, UCC § 9-402.
27 UCC 9-402(1) and Official Comment 1.
26 Ibid.
29
 The Supreme Judicial Court, in E. M. Blunt Inc. v. Giles, 228 Mass. 515, 516, 193
N.E. 43, 44 (1934), held that:
a general description of personal property in a mortgage is sufficient to in-
clude articles which can be identified and which were intended to be covered by it.
The test in such case is that, where the property can be readily identified after
rejecting false or inaccurate recitals, effect may be given to the mortgage.
Also see supra note 12.
30
 See Hart, In Defense of Certain Provisions of The Uniform Commercial Code
Relating to Formation of Sales Contracts: A Partial Reply to Professor Babb, 15 Maine
L. Rev. 21 (1963). Cf. Babb, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 7 Portland
U.L. Rev. 16 (1961), 14 Maine L. Rev. 1 (1962).
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